it is protected from authoritarian rule by a vigilant Parliament, a free press, and independent iudges. 6 The temporary elevation of the executive during a crisis need not result in a complete eclipse of Parliament, for Parliament does not have to be omnipotent to be vigilant. It must, however, be especially alert when the press is censored and the courts are acquiescent. The special session of the Canadian Parliament in August 1914 did not augur well oeor that body's role as an alert watchdog over the executive. At the very time when speeches were replete with denunciations of autocracy, Parliament passed the War Measures Act with no question as to its need and a single query as to its provisions. Only one member of Parliament, William Pugsley, a Liberal, appears to have noticed the unprecedented implications of the bill which he feared could be used to deny Canadians their fight to habeas corpus. 7 The clause he took exception to read: "Every order and warrant made or issued by any minister ... shall be conclusive evidence of all statements and matters therein contained, and no court or iudge shall inquire into or make any order in respect thereto." After second reading, a special committee of the Cabinet considered this criticism and the following day, when the bill was presented for third reading, the offending clause did not appear. The bill was passed without comment and the change went unnoticed by the House. The character of debate in the lower chamber, which was duplicated in the Senate, may be appreciated in the pledge of the leader of the opposition, Sir Willrid Laurier.' If in what has been done, or what remains to be done there may be anything, which in our judgement should not .be done or should be done differently we raise no question, we take no exception, we offer no criticism and shall offer no criticism, so long as there is a danger at the [ront. s
The dearth of opposition comment was no measure of the breadth of power delegated by Parliament in the War Measures Act. It enabled the Governor-in-Council to do whatever was deemed "necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada." The time limit specified in the Act was "during war, invasion or insurrection," but the termination of these emergencies was to be by executive proclamation. Emergency measures taken between the declaration of war on 4 August and the passage of the Act on 22 August were given retroactive statutory sanction. Finally, a separate clause made all of the Act's provisions applicable to. aliens and naturalized persons.
Some of the problems of constitutional government during crisis, albid., p. 8.
• CaN•DntN msTomcAL m•vmw which were discussed above, are clearly reveaJed in this initial grant of emergency powers. Provision was made neither for a time limit on these powers nor for a separate authority to declare an end to the crisis. Since many observers in Europe as well as in the dominions felt that the war would be short, the absence of a time limit is perhaps understandable. It is possible, too, that the system of parliamentary government based as it is on a united executive and legislature discourages concern for special safeguards to check the executive in times of crisis. The absence of debate on the wisdom of delegating broad power to the executive indicates the 'unquestioned assumption of the superiority of British democratic and parliamentary institutions. Additional safeguards did not address themselves favourab]y to the members, for they believed their system of government to be indisputably the best yet devised. Any sacrifice was possible for its preservation. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the need for an immensely strengthened executive went unquestioned. And the spirit of goodwill which prevailed when Parliament delegated these emergency powers suggested little of the acrimony to follow when the executive exercised them. While no aspect of life, private or public, escaped the influence of wartime regulations, the impact of Canada's initial experiment with emergency powers can most dearly be seen in four general areas: the economy, civil liberties, the federal system, and Parliament.
In a situation of total war, the mobilization of the economy is a principal concern of government. Despite government involvement before 1914, the Canadian economy was still basically one of laissezfaire; consequently wartime regulations impinged upon widely accepted beliefs in the virtues of private enterprise and individual initiative. The physical proximity of a powerful neutral with whom she had dose economic ties also made British precedents in this area of emergency government inappropriate. As a result Canada initially relied upon voluntary means to mobilize her economy. Even later, after 1916, when she chose to conscript wealth and regulate commerce, her policies were a combination of large amounts of persuasion and small dosages of compulsion. For these reasons it has been said that "Canada ... probably made less use of this technique of direction by the central government than any of the major belligerents. "9 An additional, but no less important, explanation for this approach lay in the simplicity of her economy. Her external trade was almost completely devoted to primary products such as timber, a er, and wheat has modified this reliance to some degree, but in earlier periods "with Magna Carta in the background and Dicey's rule of law in the oeoreground," there seemed no need oeor any "oeurther safeguard for civil liberties. "•'7 In a time of crisis, however, when arbitrary executive power is not easily restrained, Dicey's rule of law is less assuredly a guardian of fundamental liberties. One group whose rights are especially endangered in a waxtime emergency is the alien enemy. es There is no question that, according to International Law, aliens have rights that must be respected, but R is less certain what these rights are when the aliens are also residents of the country. In Canada there were over half a million persons in 1914 who were classified as of alien enemy origin and who became a problem for the government not because they were disloyal, indeed all the evidence indicates quite the contrary, but because many nativeborn Canadians suspected them of being disloyal?
Early in the conflict the government assured the residents of German and Austro-Hungarian origin that it had no intention of depriving them "of their freedom to hold property or to can T on business. "8ø Despite this pledge a number of these people found R increasingly difi]cult to gain and maintain employment. The government encouraged those of non-military age to emigrate or, at least, to secure temporary work in the United States. Those who were not permitted to leave and who did not have means of support were interned as prisoners of war. To implement this policy, alien enemies had to register, though initially registration was restricted only to those in and arotmd maior Canadian cities and was soon amended to exempt those who were employed? x The maximum number of persons interned at any one time was 8200 •-gTheir loyalty is attested to in a memorandum from C. H. Cahan, director of public safety, to the Hon. C. J. Doherty, minister of iustice, in Borden Papers, oc Once an attack had been made upon radical socialist groups, the government then prohibited all strikes and lockouts for the duration of the war. 44 When labour protested that the right to strike was the foundation of industrial liberty, the government answered that this order-in-council only made legal a situation that had been voluntarily accepted since 1914. To underline the government's concern, this order also threatened anyone who incited or participated in industrial unrest with immediate conscription into the military service. Thus while the right of association was maintained throughout the emergency, the secondary but fundamental right to strike was severely curtailed.
Of all the essential freedoms of a constitutional order, that of expression ranks perhaps highest. Yet, in wartime, it probably comes into conflict most quickly with the requirements of defence. This was true in Canada where censorship measures were among the first regulations to affect the citizenry on the outbreak of war. In 1917 censorship also became involved with the key issues of defence and conscription. In the charged atmosphere surrounding that emotional debate it was easy to believe, and even easier to accuse, the government of abusing its censorship power. While some anti-conscription propaganda was extremely objectionable, government censorship of its opposition for political or personal reasons would have been a manifest misuse of its emergency power. Yet it is not difficult to appreciate the temptation. Once the government had promised the Allies that it would increase the size of the Canadian army, the honour of Canada became linked to the adoption of conscription.
In the period before 1917, the government took a restrained view of its censorship power, claiming that it was not intended to prohibit criticisms of policies or administration. 45 While the punishments were generally severe for violation of censorship orders (possession of publications prohibited by the postmaster-general could result in a $5000 fine and five years imprisomnent), few prosecutions took place. 46 Several censors were active in this period, but all relied more on voluntary compliance than on compulsion to achieve their goals.
These censors were the ministers of militia and defence and of naval service who were responsible for cable and wireless communications entering or leaving the country; the postmaster-general who was authorized to censor the mails; a censor of publications who had jurisdiction over all printed matter in Canada; and a mail censor of the press who was intended, although there seems to have been some confusion in the mind of the Prime Minister, to be especially concerned with newspapers. 47 Censorship was confined mainly to newspapers and most of these were from the United States; only one Canadian iournal, a small Russian language newspaper, was prohibited circulation. Three books were also censored and they all emanated from Great BritainA s Two of them dealt with the immoral effects of alcohol on the Canadian army in that country as well as on the English people in general. They were not distributed in Canada because it was felt they might create disillusionment with England and the cause of the war. Opposition to censorship of the books came from two unrelated sources: members of parliament were disturbed when the censor tried to stop their discussion of the books or the reading of excerpts • and the Dominion Alliance for the Suppression of the Liquor Traffic declared that "the purpose of the censorship should be used wholly for the defeating of a foreign enemy, not the preventing of a domestic re- Since modem warfare requires total mobilization and central direction of a nation's economy and people, the Canadian federal system seemed ill-suited to respond to the challenge of emergency. Yet, except for the conscription struggle which became in part a struggle between the province of Quebec and the federal government, the federal system functioned with remarkably little friction. The continuing conflict over schools, language, and religion which simmered between Quebec and some of the other provinces before 1917 was really not a concern of federal politics, despite its introduction by Sir In view of the events of the preceding year, his statement had substance; but in the compass of the total war period, the government acted with remarkable restraint in an unprecedented and grave situation. There were cases of abuse of power, but they were few. Certainly the aliens in Canada, especially those interned, were treated well. The Wartime Elections Act was the most flagrant instance of the Government's temerity, and, given the opposition's stand, the government had reason to fear a Liberal victory would mean Canada's withdrawal from the war. Parliament, too, is open to criticism. Its silence or obvious surprise at government actions shows that often it slumbered rather than observed. In view of the great discretionary power delegated to the executive early in the war, Parliament should have been particularly vigilant. On many occasions, its members seemed to lack interest as well as questions. Even ff the government's conduct had been exemplary, and it was not, surely the House should have questioned the executive in more detail on its emergency measures. The opposition, however, usually remained silent and when emergency measures appeared, it was caught off guard.
During the short debate on the passage of the War Measures Act the Minister of Justice declared that the people of Canada must place their confidence in the government. In general it may be said that this trust was respected. This was due first to the Canadian government's initial unpreparedness and then subsequent reluctance to use its new power. The strong laissez-l•aire tradition in the dominion, typified in a wartime comment by the Prime Minister that the "less interference by a Government ... the better for the country, "74 accurately illustrates this early attitude. Even when reluctance was overcome by the pressure of events after mid-1917, the government's reliance on a combination of voluntary and mandatory measures prevented overt price regulation, weakened potentially powerful bodies like the War Trade Board, and for the most part minimized the full effects of crisis government in a free-enterprise, liberal-democratic society. Moreover, the hundreds of emergency regulations which did appear emanated from relatively few statutes, the great majority of them being based on the authority of the War Measures Act and its very broad powers. Where authority could be found outside that Act, as in the Lemieux Act in the area of labour regulation, it was used in preference to the emergency statute. Finally, the government consistently refused to use its delegated power to solve problems which were basically unrelated to the war. Those very few actions by the executive, like the repeal of military exemptions by order-in-council, which might be criticized as abuses of emergency power occurred early in 1918 and appear to have been the product of haste. This haste resulted from anxiety created by the conscription crisis, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the serious military reverses on the Western Front. Yet even in an instance like this it was characteristic of the government to seek, on its own initiative, parliamentary approval for this alteration in military policy. Where a time limit on emergency government is absent and discretion is left to the government, the critics of crisis measures must be strong in voice if not in numbers. Criticism can be an effective weapon even against a government maiority, but it must be informed. No where is this clearer than in a parliamentary democracy where party discipline continues to operate even in an emergency and the executive enioys temporary inflated power. Thus the duty of the parliamentary critic is correspondingly broadened. In Canada constitutional democracy did reassert itself and for this reason alone the country's first experiment with emergency power delegated to the executive must be counted a success. Yet this success should not disguise the lack of control which parliamentary democracy has over an absolute executive. Rather it illustrates the very urgent need for a legislature alert to the dangers posed by emergency government. This awareness is absolutely necessary if all laws are not to remain silent during wartime.
